Introduction
Shelf prices are not always the stimulus consumers use to guide their decision making. Rather, the existence of reference prices, or mental benchmarks consumers use to assess what is a "normal" or expected price, change, but consumers do not appear to respond as we would expect them to. That is, consumers appear to be insensitive to price changes between an upper and lower threshold surrounding the reference price. One popular explanation for the existence of such price-thresholds is the Assimilation-Contrast Theory (ACT, Sherif 1963 ) in which "a new stimulus encountered by an individual is judged against a background of previous experience in the category" (Kalyanaram and Little 1994) . Price variations within the region of acceptance are assimilated, or ignored, and price changes outside of this region are contrasted with the consumer's previous experience, thereby inducing a behavioral response. Others explain the fundamental asymmetry in consumer response around their reference price in terms of either Prospect Theory (PT, Kahneman and Tversky 1979) or Adaptation Level Theory (ALT, Helson 1964) . Prospect Theory maintains that consumers develop an expected or reference price, and that any price changes above that level will leave them in the domain of losses, while price reductions below their reference level will leave them in the domain of gains.
Because losses are perceived as more onerous than gains are bene…cial, according to Prospect Theory, loss aversion leads to a revealed asymmetry in price response that appears as a kinked demand curve. Adaptation Level Theory, on the other hand, argues that consumers will not respond to a stimulus if it is not deemed to be either too high or too low relative to some benchmark price that they have become adapted to. However, each of these theories presumes some sort of behavioral component that contradicts the underlying tenets of rational economic behavior. While such violations are possible, and well-documented, the burden of proof in documenting their existence is high because they remove the ability of theory to generalize and to explain market phenomenon that result from individual behavior. 1 In this study, we o¤er an alternative that is grounded in rational economic behavior.
Our explanation, on the other hand, does not require that we assume the market fails when thresholds arise. Rather, if consumers face uncertain retail prices, and incur …xed costs in searching for grocery products then the purchase decision embodies a real option value. Akin to a …nancial option to buy a share of stock (or currency, commodity contract, or other …nancial instrument) at a …xed price for a …xed time period, the ability to wait until the uncertainty surrounding the retail price is resolved creates a potentially signi…cant value for the option holder. Consequently, the decision to purchase the product when shelf prices are either above or below the reference price involves exercising the option and giving up a substantial amount of value in doing so. Allowing the shelf price to change either upward or downward su¢ cient to make exercising this option worthwhile creates a zone of apparent acceptance around the reference price in which the consumer neither capitalizes on the opportunity to take advantage of a perceived "deal" on the product, nor reluctantly responds to an underlying need for a product that is deemed relatively expensive. Intuitively, consumers know that if retail prices are volatile, there is a chance that the price will fall far enough to make immediate purchase a wise decision, and that there is also a chance that the price will rise far enough to cause them to have to ful…ll a need at an apparently usurious price. Waiting for either to happen creates inactivity that is referred to as hysteresis (Dixit and Pyndick 1994) , or the persistence of a phenomenon even after its initial cause has disappeared. Identifying hysteresis, as opposed to either ACT, PT, or ALT, requires that we estimate a threshold econometric model in which the location of the thresholds depends on factors that drive real option values, namely past price volatility. None of the alternative explanations for the existence of price thresholds depends on the volatility of retail prices in this sense, so if retail price volatility is found to be a signi…cant determinant of the price thresholds, then the data support our hysteretic theory of threshold formation.
2 1 For example, if everyone in the market possesses a di¤erent reference price, then there is no reason to explain why thresholds arise in aggregate data, despite evidence that they do (Pauwels, Srinivasan, and Franses 2007) and empirical evidence that heterogeneity explains much of the evidence of reference prices, traditionally de…ned (Lattin and Bucklin 1989) . 2 Others conjecture that the size of the zone of price acceptance depends, in part, on price volatility (Mazumdar and Jun 1992), but do not formalize why this might be the case.
We test our hysteretic explanation for the presence of a latitude of price acceptance using householdlevel scanner data from four frequently-purchased product categories (that vary in their purchase frequency; cereal, yogurt, and laundry soap) in a variant of an econometric friction model (Rosett 1959) . A friction model is appropriate for testing the theory that underlies threshold pricing because it explicitly accounts for the existence of thresholds in the data that separate households into regimes of gains, losses, and indi¤erence based on some endogenous source of censoring. In our model, the selection mechanism derives from price volatility and a real option e¤ect. Terui and Dehana (2006) is the only other study that explicitly accounts for the data-censoring implied by threshold behavior, but their model presumes a Bayesian separation mechanism and normally distributed preferences. We allow for randomness in the formation of price thresholds as in Han, Gupta and Lehmann (2001) , but the latter do not account for the underlying censoring of the data caused by thresholds. While their model is an extension of a logit model of brand choice, ours represents a fundamentally di¤erent approach to accounting for threshold-price behavior. Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in the hysteretic e¤ect addresses the issue of whether price acceptance is an artefact of heterogeneity in our data (Bell and Lattin 2000) , or are inherently probabilistic constructs (Han, Gupta, and Lehmann 2001) . If removing unobserved heterogeneity causes thresholds to disappear, then it is clear that thresholds are due to failing to account for unobserved factors that otherwise explain reference-price e¤ects.
We compare our model to other possible explanations -ACT, PT, ALT -in order to establish the validity of our model. The primary di¤erentiating factor between the hysteretic and other models is that the threshold driven by an implicit real option will widen when the variability of prices is high. That is, when a retail price is relatively volatile, the real option will be higher, so the hysteretic e¤ect will be stronger, and the threshold wider than would otherwise be the case. The other explanations for reference-price behavior are silent on the e¤ect of two-sided volatility on the existence and magnitude of price-thresholds. We compare these models using commonly-accepted models that embed reference prices, and use the speci…cation for the formation of reference prices that has been found to …t the data from several categories best (Briesch et al. 1997 ). Consequently, observations of market-level threshold e¤ects must be explained by something other than micro-level household behavior.
Our …ndings have practical importance. Marketing practitioners use the concept of "threshold e¤ects"as if it was of the order of a stylized fact (Management Science Associates 2013). That is, the implicit assumption among practitioners is that demand response is not smooth over a range of prices, but rather there exists pricing thresholds beyond which demand elasticities change in a fundamental way. Whether this is true or not is critically important for setting retail prices, because elasticities clearly drive the relationship between pricing and sales revenue. In order to be useful, a method of estimating demand models that accounts for, and is able to test for and locate, such thresholds, must be relatively simple and tractable in a relatively large demand system. In this research, we develop an approach for estimating pricing thresholds and demonstrate its usefulness in four frequently purchased consumer good categories. Many studies identify the existence of reservation prices and thresholds at the micro, household-level (Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha 2005) . While individual behavior may be the source of any reservation price behavior, marketers are more interested in the aggregate, market-level implications of individual-level reservation prices. Pauwels, Srinivasan and Franses (2007) address this problem by estimating a reservation-price model in aggregate data, but with a demand model that is not grounded in utility maximization. Bell and Lattin (2000) show that much of the reservation price evidence disappears once heterogeneity is properly accounted for, but not all. The question remains, therefore, are threshold-prices a product of aggregate, store-level data? Rather than estimate with store-level data, we estimate our threshold-price model at the individual household level, and then simulate a market equilibrium over an assumed distribution for unobserved consumer heterogeneity. Any thresholds that remain, therefore, are both consistent with individual utility maximization, and the distribution of heterogeneity that is relevant for practitioners.
We …nd that the data are consistent with our hysteretic explanation for threshold prices. One of the primary implications of the hysteretic model that di¤erentiates it from others is that the size of the latitude of price acceptance rises in the volatility of retail prices. Because option values rise in volatility, the implicit cost of excercising the option by making a purchase is higher the more variable retail prices. We …nd strong evidence in support of this outcome in each of the product categories. Second, we …nd evidence of asymmetric price response above and below the threshold. This …nding suggests that, while Prospect Theory may not provide a complete explanation of threshold-price behavior, its predictions are nonetheless relevant in data.
Third, we …nd that consumers do appear to respond to variations in retail prices around reference levels, even after controlling for heterogeneity in both the threshold and in price response. This …nding is signi…cant as reference-price formation does not appear to be an artefact of failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Finally, we …nd that our household-level estimates do indeed imply aggregate, or store-level, threshold price behavior. Because store-level data remains the workhorse of marketing analytics in practice, our …ndings are relevant to decision-makers.
Our …ndings contribute to both the theoretical and methodological literatures on reference prices and price thresholds. Conceptually, …nding support for our hysteretic model of threshold price e¤ects adds an explanation for an oft-observed phenomenon that does not rely on some sort of a behavioral deviation from neo-classical economic assumptions. Although it is not our intent to discredit behavioral models in general, nor to justify traditional economic modeling, our model shows how predictions based on simple postulates of consumer behavior are su¢ ciently general and should not be ruled out. Our approach also adds to the existing literature on this topic by synthesizing theory from …nancial economics with marketing theory to arrive at an alternative explanation for what is generally regarded as a stylized fact. On a methodological level, we contribute to the debate on whether the existence of reference prices and price thresholds are artifacts of failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity. In our model, we allow for two sources of consumer heterogeneity and still …nd evidence of reference-price behavior. We also explicitly account for the implications of threshold-price behavior for censoring e¤ects in the underlying data, and o¤er a tractable, easily-estimated alternative to existing Bayesian methods of estimating multi-threshold demand models. Finally, we contribute to the body of empirical evidence on the asymmetry of price-response to either side of price thresholds. Speci…cally, Prospect Theory suggests that consumers respond much more aggressively to price increases than to price reductions, and we …nd evidence to support this hypothesis in frequently-purchased consumer-packaged goods data.
In the second section, we provide a brief background to the theoretical and empirical literature on reference prices and price thresholds. We use this background to motivate the development of an alternative model in section three that is based in real option pricing theory, and its primary implication for purchase behavior, purchase hysteresis. We present our econometric model of purchase hysteresis in the fourth section, and describe how we implement the model in data covering four categories of consumer packaged goods. The application and relevant data are presented in a …fth section. We o¤er detailed estimation results from one category in the sixth section, and compare our …ndings to alternative model speci…cations. We also discuss our results in the context of other empirical research on this issue. A …nal section concludes, and suggests some avenues for future research that may help resolve some of the fundamental debates that remain.
Background on Reference Prices and Price Thresholds
In this section, we summarize the theories used to explain the existence of reference prices, and how they may give rise to thresholds in consumer decision making. These theories are grouped into three broad classi…cations as to their origin: (1) neo-classical economics, (2) consumer behavior and applied psychology, and (3) …nancial economics. We summarize the …rst two in this section, and o¤er our alternative as part of the third group of explanations in the next section. There we describe how our new theory of threshold prices compares with existing theories in terms of its implications for observed pricing patterns, and retail practice.
Neo-Classical Economic Theories
While demand curves in principles of economics are typically represented as smooth and continuous, the notion of a "kinked" demand curve arose early in the theory of imperfect competition with di¤erentiated products. Sweezy (1939) was the …rst to advance the notion that rival …rms in oligopoly will match price increases, but not price reductions. Therefore, if an individual …rm tries to raise its price, it loses a large amount of market share, but cannot gain much market share by reducing its price. In the kinked-demand story, however, it is di¢ cult to disentangle whether the observed response in demand derives from consumer behavior, or a rational …rm response to expectations of consumer behavior. 3 Similarly, more recent research on the apparent …xity of retail prices cites the existence of …xed costs (termed "menu costs") of changing prices as an explanation for apparent thresholds in price response. Such …xed costs introduce a fundamental non-convexity to …rms'price-change decision so that prices will not change smoothly in response to underlying changes in demand or costs, but rather follow an (s L ; S; s U ) bounds rule (Sheshinski and Weiss 1977; Caballero and Engel 1999; Slade 1998 Slade , 1999 . According to this rule, a retailer may want to change her price toward an "ideal"level, S, but she will only do so when the bene…t of a change exceeds the total adjustment cost. Once the desired price reaches either an upper or lower threshold, it is immediately changed to the target value. Putler (1992) also demonstrates the implications of reference-price behavior for neo-classical market equilibrium, but does not attempt to explain why reference prices arise in the …rst place.
Behavioral Theories
Several theories in consumer behavior and applied psychology have been developed to explain reference prices and their link to the existence of thresholds in consumer decision making. The …rst was Adaptation Level Theory (ALT), put forward in pioneering research by Helson (1964 Various theories have been developed to examine the nuances of identifying reference price structure, relying on quantitative methods for testing (Winer 1986 Neither neo-classical nor behavioral theories of threshold pricing are entirely satisfactory. While neoclassical models o¤er a rigorous explanation for how thresholds can arise from rational, optimizing behavior, they are silent on how the value of the thresholds is determined. On the other hand, behavioral theories implicitly assume a failure on the part of consumers to rationally consider all available information, or to respond in less-than-rational ways to price changes. In the next section, we o¤er an alternative to both that is grounded in optimizing behavior, and provides estimates of threshold values that are empirically tractable.
Conceptual Model of Purchase Hysteresis
The theory of purchase hysteresis derives from the concept of a real option from the …nancial economics literature (Dixit 1989; . In this section, we demonstrate how a real option arises in a household's purchase decision, and how this gives rise to a hysteretic e¤ect. This hysteretic e¤ect, in turn, is observationally equivalent to the latitude of price acceptance observed by other authors.
In an uncertain retail-price environment, the …xed costs of searching for and purchasing a good embed a real option in the purchase decision. The value of this real option rises in the level of price volatility, which provides a convenient way to test for the existence of a real option. Before testing econometrically for the presence of a real option e¤ect, we argue why, logically, shopping for and purchasing consumer goods must include a real option component. Speci…cally, there are three necessary conditions that must exist for a real option value to arise: (1) ongoing uncertainty, (2) …xed costs, and (3) a unique opportunity to make a decision (Dixit 1989 clearly have sovereignty over their purchase decisions, so there is no market mechanism through which the real option value will be arbitraged away. In summary, the appropriate conditions exist for a purchase decision to embody a real option value, one that is signi…cant relative to the shelf price of the product. In this section, therefore, we develop a simple mathematical model of how real options can be expected to arise in grocery purchases, and derive an econometric model that can test for their presence in household-level scanner data.
Solving for the dynamically optimal purchase process under price uncertainty results in a discontinuous purchase path similar to one that would arise with a model of economic friction (Rosett 1959) . If the cost of purchasing a consumer product in a retail store includes a real-option component, then we expect to see a consumer respond to prices that rise above his or her reference price only if a certain threshold "price gap" (di¤erence between the shelf price and reference price) has been reached, and respond to a price reduction only if the price gap falls below a di¤erent threshold value. When retail purchases are subject to price thresholds, consumers are in the domain of gains when the shelf price falls below the reference price (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) , or in the domain of losses when self prices rise above their reference price. Because the size of the threshold includes both a generalized measure of search costs and a real option value, the consumer follows a discontinuous purchase strategy wherein the gap between the upper and lower purchase-price thresholds widens with the value of the option. We show how this result occurs by deriving a consumer's reference price and then demonstrating how it is likely to di¤er from the observed stimulus price, or the price that leads to either purchasing or switching.
To make our concept of the source of volatility concrete, consider a retail food product such as co¤ee or cereal, where the production cost is largely driven the price of the underlying commodity, and production labor. While labor is relatively stable, and predictable, the commodity cost can lead to wide variation in the p jt for consumer h, brand j, and period t: Reference prices are assumed to be brand-speci…c given the empirical evidence on the preferred speci…cation for reference-prices (Briesch et al. 1997) . Note that this de…nition is not standard, but we feel it is more intuitive as the consumer gains if shelf prices fall below the reference price (or the value of g h jt rises). If retail prices are indeed uncertain, then they are expected to follow a stochastic process over time. For simplicity, we assume the relationship between a consumer's reference price and the retail price follows a Geometric Brownian Motion process:
suppressing the time subscript, where is the mean drift rate, is the standard deviation of the process, and dz de…nes the Wiener increment with properties: E(dz) = 0; E(dz 2 ) = dt: Search costs consist of opportunity costs of the consumer's time, travel costs, or even cognitive processing costs that are incurred in …nding a product, considering alternatives, and making a purchase (Roberts and Lattin 1991), each of which is sunk, or irretrievable after the search process has been completed. De…ne these costs generically as c h t as they vary across consumers, and over time.
From a consumer's perspective, his or her wealth is conceptualized as the present value of a stream of lifetime consumption decisions, plus the value of other investments. If the consumer's objective is to maximize the wealth, or the value, of his or her household by making optimal purchase decisions, the fundamental arbitrage condition that determines the value of the real option compares the value of a household that purchases (V p;h ) with one that does not purchase (V n;h ): Faced with a decision of purchasing or not purchasing at each period, the maximum value a household can attain is the maximum of whether it purchases or does not purchase, or:
where is the marginal cost of search, assuming search takes place only when a purchase occurs. 4 The solution to this problem provides upper and lower threshold values of g h jt that constitute optimal switching points between responding and not responding to a particular value of the price gap.
Unlike other price-threshold models, ours maintains that in order for a consumer to purchase a brand, the di¤erence between the shelf and reference prices must be large enough to not only cover the direct costs of search, but also the implicit option value of waiting to make a purchase. Exercising this option (and thus purchasing or switching) means sacri…cing an asset of real value to the household, therefore, doing so represents a real and signi…cant opportunity cost. Indeed, even for small search costs, ongoing uncertainty in the price gap can cause a wide gap between the latent desire to purchase and observed purchase behavior.
Given the stochastic process governing price gaps, there may be a long wait for the shelf price to either rise or fall enough to induce a stimulus for purchase behavior, where "wait" is de…ned in terms of a range of retail prices between the upper and lower response thresholds. This wait is interpreted as the latitude of price acceptance (Kalyanaram and Little 1994) , or hysteresis in purchase behavior.
The problem described in (2) above can be solved using dynamic programming techniques (Caballero and Engel 1999; Slade 1999), but a contingent claims approach (Dixit 1989 (Dixit , 1992 provides analytical expressions for the threshold values of g h j that are amenable to econometric estimation. Contingent claims analysis treats the value of waiting to make a purchase as a contingent security -contingent on the underlying price-process upon which the decision depends. Compare the value of a household that decides to purchase with one that does not using the value functions in (2). With search costs, and uncertainty of the form shown in (1), the value of a household that does not purchase consists of one capitalized stream of purchase decisions, plus the value of the option to purchase, while the value of a household that does purchase is the discounted value of a consumption stream that includes the most current decision. Given the process for g h jt shown
in (1), the equilibrium condition for a household that decides not to purchase is found by …rst equating the instantaneous expected return on household wealth due to a change in the price gap with the required return on the household's wealth ( V n ). In this case, the instantaneous expected return consists only of the expected rise in the value of the household (Dixit 1989 ) so the partial di¤erential equation becomes:
where we note that subscripts indicate partial di¤erentiation, we suppress the household indices for clarity, is the required rate of return, and the other variables are as previously de…ned. The general solution to (3) is then found by substituting g = V n and solving the resulting quadratic equation:
where is a constant to be determined. This equation has two roots: 1 < 0, and 2 > 1 such that:
the general solution to the di¤erential equation (3) for a household that does not purchase must re ‡ect this fact so we write:
which must then be solved for values of A n and B n . The fact that this expression solves (3) can be veri…ed by taking the …rst and second derivatives of V n in (6) and substituting the result into (3). As in Dixit (1989) , the two terms on the right-side of (6) represent the option to purchase, while the value of not purchasing is normalized to zero by assumption.
We determine the value of the option by applying the value-matching and smooth pasting conditions to the expressions for the value of a non-purchasing household, and one that responds to the price-gap stimulus.
The value of a household that decides to purchase is determined solely by the ‡ow of services provided by the good as they have already exercised the option to buy. The value of the good, in turn, is assumed to be equal to the price gap as it represents the di¤erence between what a household is willing to pay for the good, and what the market requires them to pay. Because the price gap is assumed to drift at an average rate of ; the present value of this stream of bene…ts to the household is found as:
for a constant , so the value of the household is comprised entirely of the value of purchasing the good in question. Solving for the constant terms is possible if we recognize that for small values of g the value of the option to wait will be very low, so A n = 0. Further, at a su¢ ciently high level of g, call it the upper-threshold, or g U , a household will immediately purchase so the value of a non-purchasing household must equal the value of a household that does purchase less the …xed cost of search:
because the value of a household that purchases is equal to the capitalized value of all desired consumption.
Next, the smooth pasting condition requires that the incremental value of waiting to purchase as g rises must be equal to the incremental value of a household that has already purchased, or:
The smooth pasting and value matching conditions yield two equations and two unknowns. Solving these for g U gives a closed-form expression for the threshold price gap as a function of the parameters of the model:
where 2 is a function of both the drift rate and volatility of the price gap, and is strictly greater than one in value.
Using traditional economic decision rules, a household in this environment purchases if the gains are greater than the annualized …xed cost of shopping and buying: g U > c( ): However, because 2 is greater than one, the existence of a real option creates a wedge between the traditional and "full cost"
thresholds that depends on the volatility of underlying prices and the magnitude of search costs (Dixit 1992 ; Dixit and Pindyck 1994). A similar line of reasoning applies in calculating the value of g L . If retail prices are falling, consumers will wait until the observed price falls below not only the reference price, but also the cost of shopping and the a real option of not purchasing. As a result, the lower threshold price gap is signi…cantly below zero. Combining both upper and lower thresholds, observed price gaps imply a discontinuous pattern of purchasing with no activity over a wide range of observed shelf prices. De…ning the indirect utility associated with a price gap of g t as U (g t ), a consumer's purchase behavior maximizes the indirect utility function given by:
where g L t < 0; g U t > 0, and u t is an independent, identically distributed random variable in time period t.
Because the price gap varies randomly over time, it will likely take some time before the threshold level is exceeded. This, in turn, represents the e¤ect that the real option value exerts over the household's response to changes in the price gap -an e¤ect we interpret as a latitude as price acceptance, or purchase hysteresis.
Econometric Model of Threshold Prices 4.1 Overview
Our conceptual model suggests that rational consumers will respond to price changes in a way that can be described by three distinct regions, or zones of activity, or inactivity, as the case may be. In the …rst region, consumers perceive a reduction in the shelf price as su¢ cient to warrant exercising the real option they hold on not making a purchase, respond to the price stimulus, and buy the product. In the second region, any variation in shelf price is not su¢ cient to trigger a purchase, so we observe a relative insensitivity to normal price variation. In the third region, the shelf price rises su¢ ciently to induce a di¤erent response, whether to buy the product only out of a fundamental need, in spite of the higher price, or to buy a competing product.
Of course, identifying these regions is conditional on perceived need: Consumption rate, interpurchase time, and the resulting level of household inventory clearly drives both the need to purchase an alternative brand, or to stay out of the category altogether.
Econometric Model of Purchase Hysteresis
Equation (11) to determine the factors that in ‡uence the probability that a …rm changes either its price or stock of capital goods. For current purposes, however, our interest lies in estimating the size of the thresholds caused by the real option embedded in searching for, and purchasing, a desired item. A friction model is appropriate when the dependent variable responds in a discontinuous way to changes in an independent variable -when the latent stimulus for activity must exceed a certain threshold level before a response is observed (Rosett 1959; Maddala 1983 ). In Rosett's (1959) example, he models the response of asset holdings to changes in their yield. Due to unobservable transactions costs, only relatively large changes in yield cause a reallocation.
With this approach, we are able to estimate the size of each threshold as well as test the e¤ect of each explanatory variable on the real option value that is likely present.
There are a number of econometric implications of the real option e¤ect that are manifest in the friction model. First, we will not observe a consumer response to a price gap despite considerable variation in a latent (unobservable utility) desire to do so. Second, the extent to which latent utility ‡uctuates before a response occurs, or the threshold price gap, will rise with its expected volatility. Third, the gap between the upper and lower thresholds will widen with the magnitude of search costs. Fourth, purchases will exhibit signi…cant inertia, meaning that when purchases do occur, the underlying decision will not change even after their apparent cause has disappeared, and …fth, upward price changes need bear no quantitative relationship to the size of downward price changes so response will appear to be asymmetric (Kahneman and Tversky 1979 ). Each of these hypotheses is tested within an estimable form of (11) wherein we do not observe purchases or switches until the di¤erence between reference and shelf prices either rises above, or falls below a certain threshold level. To arrive at this form of the model, however, we …rst de…ne each of the theoretical constructs that are thought to underlie purchase hysteresis.
Utility is a function of not only the price gap, but elements of the marketing mix, brand-speci…c preference, brand loyalty, and category inventory. We de…ne household-speci…c reference prices as a brand-level, geometric weighted average of past prices. In doing so, we follow Briesch et al. (1997) who test a number of speci…cations for the reference price, and …nd that a household-speci…c, geometric weighted average provided the best …t. The friction model suggests that there is no reason why price response should be symmetric on either side of the full-cost thresholds, so we let the parameters of interest vary across regimes of rising, falling, and staying the same.
In order to test the purchase hysteresis model outlined above, we disaggregate the price gap into observable and unobservable components, and the observable part into regimes in which the reference price is above the current shelf price, below the shelf price, and equal to the shelf price. De…ne this part of the price gap as We bring each of these elements together in a random utility model of brand choice de…ned over the three price-gap regimes. Indirect utility, therefore, is written as:
where h;k j are household-and-brand speci…c preference parameters in regime k = G; A; S, k is a vector of marketing-mix, loyalty, and inventory e¤ects in regime k, k is the price-response parameter in regime k, and the other variables are as de…ned above. Assuming the iid error term is Type I Extreme Value distributed, the choice model assumes the usual logit form. However, in this problem we account for the discontinuous nature of the expected purchase pattern.
In this model, note that the U and L parameters provide a means of directly testing the phenomenon Dixit (1989) describes as hysteresis, or the inertia that some economic variables tend to possess after their originating cause has disappeared. Further, by writing (12) in this way, the structural parameters of (10) are not identi…ed, per se, and the solution is a highly non-linear function of volatility. Therefore, the i parameters are in reduced form with typical element: i = ( 2 =( 2 1)) i , and we estimate a linear approximation to the true impact of volatility on each threshold. Numerical simulations described in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) suggest that this approximation is likely to be a good one.
Estimation Method
The entire model is estimated over all regimes (domain of gains, domain of losses, and no price gap) using maximum likelihood. Because the error term in (12) represents the distribution of consumer tastes in our sample market, the probability that household h purchases good j, written as P h (j = 1); is derived by invoking a random-utility assumption such that:
where the speci…c form of the likelihood function is determined by our distributional assumption regarding u jt . Terui and Dahana (2006) estimate a similar discontinuous-utility model under the assumption of normality (yielding a probit model), but the probit is not appropriate for modeling price response as it implies some density on each side of zero (Train 2003) . Therefore, we assume instead that the distribution of consumer tastes is Type I EV distributed. Assuming is the EV cumulative density function, is the EV probability density function, and the mean utility for brand j in regime k is
then P h;k (j = 1) represents the probability that household h purchases brand j in regime k: Therefore, the likelihood function for the friction model is:
j ]; h = 1; 2; :::; H; t = 1; 2; :::; T de…ned over regimes of n 1 observations where the shelf price is below the reference price, n 3 observations where it is below, and n 2 observations where it is equal, where k ; k = 1; 2; 3 are binary indicators for purchases in the domain of gains, indi¤erence, and losses, respectively. The likelihood to be maximized is the sum of (14) over all households and time-periods. Applying this model to high-frequency, household-level data on a speci…c grocery product, we are able to estimate the potentially persistent e¤ects of search costs and retail price volatility on the existence and size of the latitude of price acceptance.
Operationalizing Utility Arguments
Operationalizing the model of utility that underlies our threshold model involves a number of constructs. In each case, we adhere to the extant literature as closely as possible in order to di¤erentiate our model only with the inclusion of the threshold term. In the econometric model above, we de…ne mean utility in regime k for brand j as
l g ; where p j = shelf-price of brand j, f ea j = a binary indicator variable that equals 1 when brand j is featured, dis j = a binary indicator variable that equals 1 when brand j is on display, pro j = a binary indicator variable that equals 1 when brand j is on promotion, lp hj = a binary indicator variable that equals 1 when household h purchased brand j on the last purchase occasion, bl hj = a the within-household market share of brand j for household h; inv h = category inventory held by household h on the date of purchase, st s = a binary indicator variable that equals 1 if the brand is purchased in store s.
Note that by including the shelf-price among the arguments of X h jt ;our maintained model is the "stickershock" model of Winer (1986), Bell and Lattin (2000) , and Chang, Siddarth, and Weinberg (1999). Among the other variables, we calculate inventory in a relatively simple way. First, we use the entire data set to calculate the average consumption rate (at the category level) of each household. We then estimate the initial amount on hand from the observed consumption rate, and the date of the …rst purchase. We then calculate a running inventory by adding new purchases, and subtracting consumption over the entire sample period.
We measure loyalty in two ways, following Han, Gupta, and Lehmann (2001). The …rst measure, lp hj , is a state-dependent measure that is de…ned in repeat-purchase terms. That is, a household is deemed loyal to a speci…c brand if it is purchased on the previous shopping trip. The second measure, bl hj ; is a cross-sectional measure of brand loyalty in that it represents the share of brand j for household h calculated over a burn-in period. For this purpose, we use the …rst 52 weeks of data. Each of these measures are well-accepted in the reference-price literature (Mayhew and Winer 1992; Kalwani and Yim 1992).
Allowing the volatility parameter to vary randomly over households addresses the concern expressed by Bell and Lattin (2000) that the sticker shock e¤ect is largely a result of failing to account for unobserved household heterogeneity. Doing so also re ‡ects the probabilistic nature of thresholds captured by Han, Gupta, and Lehmann (2001), but in a di¤erent way. In the utility model (12) , the threshold parameters ( That is, each household's reference price for brand j is an exponentially-weighted average of the previous reference price value, and the current shelf price: compare to a naive speci…cation in which = 0; others estimate the lag-weight parameter using a grid-search procedure and choose the value that maximizes the likelihood function in a discrete fashion (Han, Gupta and Lehmann 2001). In this study, we follow the latter and …nd a value of 0:6 provides a superior goodness of …t to other non-zero values, and to the naive value = 0. Because this result is well-established in the literature, the results reported below for all models make this same assumption.
Data Description
We estimate the model using data from four categories of products represented in the IRI Academic Data Set (Bronnenburg, Kruger, and Mela 2008). We use household panel data from Eau Claire, WI for the years 2009 -2011, focusing …rst on purchases from the ready-to-eat cereal category, and Infoscan (store-level) data over the same period in order to impute missing prices in the household panel data. After completing our analysis of the cereal data, we replicate our estimation approach with co¤ee, yogurt, and laundry detergent data in order to establish the validity and robustness of the model. We use the …rst dataset, cereal, to investigate whether or not there exists a stylized fact, or an observation that is clear from summary data only, that suggests our explanation may be valid even before econometric estimation.
There are a number of reasons why cereal provides an excellent context with which to study reference prices. First, cereal is purchased with su¢ cient frequency that the notion of consumers forming internal reference prices is both intuitive and plausible. If consumers shop frequently, they are more likely to be able to recall prices paid in the recent past (Briesch, et al. 1997 ). Further, cereal manufacturers introduce new products every month, and o¤er frequent manufacturer promotions. Although frequent promotions can reduce reference prices, the variation in retail prices they imply helps researchers identify behavior when prices change either above the reference price or below. Third, the cereal category is dominated by two manufacturers, Kelloggs and General Mills, who are well-known to behave strategically through both prices and product introductions (Nevo 2001 ). When there is a closely-competitive product for consumers to switch into, the notion of a "kinked demand curve" is more likely to arise. Fourth, cereal is an important category to retailers, so tends to re ‡ect a retailers'overall pricing strategy. If a retailer claims to operate some form of everyday-low-price (EDLP) strategy, then cereal prices will generally be lower and more stable than at other retailers. Stable prices, of course, are more conducive to consumers'forming reference prices based on their own memories. In sum, if consumers do indeed form reference prices for frequently-purchased consumer packaged goods, then cereal is likely a good context in which they will be revealed.
In panel data, it is necessary to have data on prices for not only the product that was purchased, but those that were not purchased as well. Both the household-purchase and store-level contains a masked store code that allowed us to merge both data sets by store, week, and UPC. By combining the household and store-level data sets, we observe the complete set of prices, and other marketing mix variables, for all UPCs available on a given purchase trip. We include only households who purchase cereal from the two most popular stores in the data set because the other stores do not provide price information to IRI, so we are unable to impute price for non-purchased items in a consistent way. The resulting merged data set provides su¢ cient variation in prices and choice probabilities across brands and over time in order to identify the reference-price mechansisms we investigate (see tables 1 and 2).
[
tables 1 and 2 in here]
Household data is necessary for our analysis because we model household-speci…c reference prices, and require household-level choice-variation to identify the model. While tables 1 and 2 provide aggregatedevidence in support of variation in choice probabilities, table 3 shows the characteristics of the households in our sample. The data in this table reveals that our sample skews slightly higher in mean income relative to the U.S. average, and exhibits less racial diversity than a more general sample would, but the Eau Claire data are nonetheless well-accepted for quantitative analyses such as the one we present here.
[table 3 in here]
If reference prices are indeed a feature of the data, they should be apparent from simply examining price data and the associated sales volumes. If small changes in the price of a particular brand are met with only small changes in volume, but larger changes induce substantial changes, then this would provide evidence for the existence of reference prices, if not volatility-induced price thresholds. Table 4 
Results and Discussion
We …rst present and interpret the results obtained with data from our focal category -ready-to-eat cereal -and then compare the results from our maintained model with estimates from other categories, and from other, plausible alternatives.
Estimation Results
The sticker shock model maintains that shelf prices will continue to have a negative e¤ect on utility, even when reference prices are appropriately taken into account. And, de…ned as we do here, the price-gap term should be positively related to utility as reductions in the shelf price below the reference price represent bene…ts for the consumer. Our version of the sticker shock model further maintains that the price-gap term must reach a certain value before consumers change their behavior. We specify this threshold term as a function of the variance of the price-gap variable. In table 5 These results, however, assume there is no unobserved heterogeneity in response to variations in either price or price-gap volatility.
[ With these estimation results, we are able to address the question raised by Pauwels, Srinivasan and Franses (2007). Namely, they are concerned with whether reference prices and response thresholds are an artefact of household-level data, or whether they can be expected to arise in aggregate data as well? While most of the empirical analyses of this question use household-level data, where threshold behavior is apparent even from casual inspection, many market analysts work with aggregate data, and still operate on the assumption that price-response is subject to threshold-like behavior. Because we are able to explicitly estimate threshold parameters with our friction-model approach, and the distribution of consumer heterogeneity that governs the location of the thresholds, we examine whether they are likely to be apparent in aggregate, Second, we use the simulated aggregate data to estimate simple models of threshold price behavior for each brand. From a practitioner's perspective, price-thresholds exist when the response elasticity di¤ers in a meaningful away above and below a certain price level. We use the price thresholds in …gure 1 to de…ne these regions, and estimate simple own-price elasticities above and below the threshold price levels. We show the estimation results from a sample of 10 brands in table 6. These results show that, in each case, the aggregate price elasticity di¤ers signi…cantly between consumers in the domain of gains relative to those in the domain of losses. In particular, the response elasticity is lower (in absolute value) when the shelf price is below the lower threshold (domain of gains), relative to when the price is above the upper threshold (domain of losses).
As with the household-level estimates, these …ndings support the predictions of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and suggest that consumers are more sensitive to variations in price when experiencing losses, than when they perceive observed price to be o¤ering "a good deal." From a revenue-management perspective, these …ndings are also interesting in that the gains-elasticity is uniformly below 1.0 (in absolute value) and the loss-elasticity is above 1.0. This outcome suggests that retailers can increase revenue by raising shelf prices when the "aggregate consumer" perceives himself to be in a positive position, and can increase revenue by reducing shelf prices when the representative consumer perceives losses. This is neither shocking nor counter-intuitive, but does provide a formal empirical rationale for sound retailing behavior.
[ 
Comparison to Alternative Models
We compare the …t of our maintained model against three alternatives. To ensure the comparison is valid, however, we restrict our attention to the class of models that explicitly account for the multiple-regime nature of the threshold model. Because models that do not control for the censored nature of the data that is implied by threshold behavior are fundamentally inconsistent, any comparison between our model and a single-regime model would be comparing apples and oranges. Maintaining the multiple-regime structure implied by the threshold model, the primary di¤erences between our utility model and others in the literature (Lattin and Bucklin 2001; Han, Gupta, and Lehmann 2001) are the inclusion of the shelf price in addition to the price-gap term (the "sticker-shock" model), modeling price-thresholds as dependent upon price volatility, and allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in the size of the thresholds. Therefore, the …rst alternative contains neither the sticker-shock term, volatility, nor unobserved heterogeneity. In the second alternative, we include a volatility term, but not the sticker-shock term or unobserved heterogeneity. In the third, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity. We also estimated …xed-coe¢ cient and random coe¢ cient versions of the three-regime sticker shock model (see table 5 ), in addition to one in which both thresholds and price-response are random parameters. Because these models are nested, we compare the goodness-of-…t using standard likelihoodratio tests. We also estimate the preferred two-regime speci…cation in three other categories (yogurt, co¤ee, and laundry detergent) in order to examine the robustness of our results across di¤erent product categories.
In table 7 , we show estimation results obtained from models that do not include the shelf-price term, but do include various forms of the price-gap volatility term that forms the core of our maintained model. to the preferred sticker-shock alternative. Again using a LR test, we …nd a calculated chi-square statistic of 506.40, which suggests that the best sticker-shock model provides a better …t to the data than a comparable model that does not include both the price-gap and shelf-price.
[ table 7 in here]
In table 8, we present estimation results from categories that are more frequently purchased than cereal (yogurt) and less frequently purchased (co¤ee and laundry detergent). Reference price-response is likely to be relatively sensitive to frequency of purchase (or the wavelength of the purchase cycle) because our reference-price mechanism is based on the consumer's ability to recall the price paid on the focal brand at the last purchase occasion. The longer the time since last purchase, the less likely the consumer is to be able to recall the price paid. For all three categories, we present estimates from our maintained sticker-shock speci…cation that accounts for heterogeneity in response to both price and price-gap volatility. Again, our key parameter estimates are the price-gap responses and estimated threshold (volatility) parameters. In each case, the estimates in table 8 show that the price-gap term has a positive e¤ect whether households are in the domain of gains or losses, and that the marginal e¤ect di¤ers signi…cantly between regimes. Finding that the price-gap is not statistically signi…cant in the "gain" regime for co¤ee and detergent supports the conjecture that consumers have a more di¢ cult time forming reference prices for relatively long-cycle products. Moreover, the asymmetry of this outcome lends further support to the notion that consumers behave in fundamentally di¤erent ways when experiencing gains instead of losses. While they do not appear to care whether shelf prices fall below their reference price, their behavior changes signi…cantly when shelf prices rise above reference prices. Further, the location of the implied threshold e¤ect depends on the volatility of the price-gap term, con…rming the real-option hypothesis maintained throughout. That is, the size of the latitude of acceptance between the upper and lower price-thresholds appears to widen in the variability of the di¤erence between reference and shelf prices.
Implications
These results support the hypothesis that consumers appear to respond to not only shelf prices, but also to the di¤erence between shelf prices and some notion of what the price of a product "should be." More speci…cally, they behave as if there are thresholds around this reference price that induce fundamentally di¤erent behavior depending upon whether shelf prices rise above the upper threshold, or fall below the lower threshold. While these insights are not unique, we also show that these thresholds are driven largely by the existence of a real option that consumers are reluctant to exercise too early, or too late.
Our …ndings have important implications for both research in this area and marketing of consumer packaged goods in general. First, while others include price-volatility as an argument of threshold functions in empirical models similar to ours (Han, Gupta, and Lehmann 2001, for example) we o¤er a theoretical explanation and an empirical approach that is grounded in threshold-price behavior. The importance of this advance is less in the technical details of the econometric model, but that we o¤er an explanation for consumer behavior that is grounded in rational, optimizing behavior and not in a violation of rational economic behavior. This …nding suggests that apparent violations of economic rationality may not necessarily be due to pathological consumer behavior, but rather the failure to adequately model the complexity of the decision process.
Second, from a practitioner's standpoint our …ndings suggest that price thresholds are indeed important, and that the latitude of price acceptance around reference prices is relatively large. This, in turn, means that retailers have some cover in changing prices for frequently-purchased goods when the cost of search is high, and prices volatile, but the cost of exceeding either the upper or lower price threshold is higher than previously believed in terms of lost revenue.
Third, our …ndings suggest that there is some scope for strategic obfuscation on the part of retailers (Ellison and Ellison 2009 ). Although it is well understood that frequent promotions can erode brand equity, inducing price variability can widen the latitude of price acceptance, providing retailers more ‡exibility to change prices before consumers will notice changes in the shelf price.
Fourth, although our model is grounded in optimizing economic behavior, our …ndings are fully consistent with the behavioral theories of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in that consumers appear to be more averse to retail prices rising above their upper threshold than they are appreciative of prices that fall below their lower threshold. In some sense, this …nding provides both theoretical and empirical support for the kinked demand curve of Sweezy (1939) and has dramatic e¤ects on retailer pricing strategies (Kopalle, Rao, and Assungdo 1996). If demand is more elastic above the upper threshold than it is below the lower threshold, then aggregate demand curves will exhibit a "kink" around the reference price. The reference price then becomes a natural choice for rival retailers to regard as the industry-standard price, and a focal point for tacitly collusive pricing behavior. Moreover, von Massow and Hassini (2013) show that threshold-price behavior can generate cyclical optimal price-paths, as opposed to a single-price policy.
Conclusion
In this paper, we document a new explanation for the existence of threshold e¤ects in consumers'purchases of consumer packaged goods. If consumers face a …xed cost of search, and if retail prices are volatile around consumers'reference prices, then their shopping decisions will embody a real option. A real option implies that consumers will rationally wait for observed prices to either rise above an upper threshold or fall below a lower threshold before exercising their option to respond to an observed price change. These thresholds form a zone of inaction that has been described as the latitude of price acceptance in the behavioral literature. As a behavioral construct, price acceptance depends on idiosyncractic behavior that may be di¢ cult to exploit from a practical perspective. Rather, our theory suggests that the zone of inaction widens in the volatility of retail prices, or more precisely the di¤erence between retail prices and consumers'reference prices, so can be used by retailers to set prices strategically.
We test our theory of threshold price behavior using an extension of the friction model of Rosett (1959) that accounts for unobserved household heterogeneity and extreme-value errors. Rather than segment the price-response term in a traditional model of brand choice, our econometric model explicitly recognizes the censored nature of data generated by threshold-price behavior. We estimate our econometric model using household-level data from the cereal, yogurt, co¤ee, and detergent categories. In each case, we …nd evidence in support of reference price behavior, and support for the real option explanation for the existence of threshold prices. Because retailers are generally more concerned with aggregate behavior than individual choices, we show that our …ndings aggregate out to the market level, and that our …ndings are not an artefact of focusing only on household behavior. In this sense, our model provides an operational tool that practitioners can exploit to improve pricing strategy.
There are many implications that follow from these results, but perhaps the most important concern the opportunity a¤orded retailers to price strategically. Inaction by consumers implies that they assimilate price changes into a pattern of perceived "normal" prices, an assimilation process that is economically-optimal according to the theory advanced here, and do not change their behavior in a signi…cant way. If retailers are able to estimate the location of the thresholds beyond which consumers no longer assimilate price changes, they can raise prices up to a point just below the upper threshold, and maximize revenue without losing tra¢ c. If all retailers price this way, then a common price point can arise in a way that is observationally equivalent to tacit collusion. Hysteretic behavior on the part of consumers, therefore, represents a source of retail market power that has not been previously identi…ed. Retailers can exploit this form of market power by either raising search costs, or causing prices to become more volatile over time.
Future research in this area may extend our approach to products other than consumer packaged goods.
Consumer durables, for example, represent purchases that are more discrete, lumpy, and a longer-term commitment of household resources. For these reasons, the real option phenomenon described here is likely to be more signi…cant for consumer durables than for consumer packaged goods. Because the zone of inaction induced by price variability rises in both volatility and the cost of search, categories that are subject to relatively high search costs may also exhibit sharper threshold results than those shown here. Healthcare insurance, retirement plans, and other inherently complicated products are likely to exhibit relatively wide pricing thresholds. Note: A small / large loss or gain is de…ned as a price-gap that is larger than one standard deviation from the mean. 
